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ABSTRACT
For the past 20 years, there has been a growing aware­
ness and acceptance of the palliative care concepts of 
Hospice. Hospice and the concept of palliative care repre­
sent a dramatic shift from the traditional medical model of 
physician-directed, institutional-centered health care.
What are the guiding principles of palliative care and 
what are their ethical underpinnings? The ethical principles 
of autonomy, justice and care will be explored, as well as the 
possibility for the abuse of palliative care under the current 
climate of healthcare reform.
Recommendations will be made pertaining to reform of the 
healthcare system, the education of healthcare professionals 
and safeguards against using palliative care for the sole 
purpose of cost-savings. Finally, there will be discussion 
about the benefits and burdens that might surface as a result 
of viewing the provision of palliative care from a combined 
perspective of justice and care.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Hospice, as defined by the National Hospice Organiza­
tion provides palliative care to terminally ill patients, 
their families, and significant others, 24 hours a day, 7 
days a week, in both home and facility-based settings. 
Physical, social, spiritual, and emotional care is provided 
during the last stages of illness, during the dying process, 
and during bereavement by a medically-directed interdisci­
plinary team consisting of patients, families, profession­
als, and volunteers. Hospice philosophy recognizes dying as 
part of the normal process of living and focuses on main­
taining the quality of remaining life, neither hastening nor 
postponing death.1
The growth of the hospice movement is one of the most 
recent developments in the health care industry and has come 
at a time when the focus has shifted from primarily institu­
tion-based care to predominantly home-based care.2 At the 
same time, with the acceleration of pressures on reduciing 
health care costs and calls for reform, considerably more 
attention has been focused on proposals to control costs at 
the end of life.3 "Several studies have shown hospice care 
in the last year of life to be less expensive than conven­
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tional care, with a greater cost advantage for home care 
hospices than hospital-based hospices." 4 5 6 7 8  However, 
the only study that randomized patients to conventional care 
or hospice care found no significant differences in cost.9 
Although it is not unanimous, the literature points to 
positive trends in the ability of hospice to be a cost- 
effective alternative for the terminally ill.
Our inability to finance the ever-increasing demand for 
health care services is forcing us to evaluate the princi­
ples of justice that have previously guided our society in 
formulating its health care policies. If the requirement of 
distributive justice is that people should get what they 
deserve, then the challenge for those working to reform 
health care is to determine what it is that people are 
entitled to. Proponents of hospice are telling us that what 
the terminally ill are entitled to is access to palliative 
care.
Health care policies have generally been established 
with three primary goals in mind: increasing access,
reducing costs, and increasing quality. These goals are 
sometimes in conflict with each other and may require 
tradeoffs that would initiate discussions of the ethical 
problem: who should get what health benefits? It is within
this context that this thesis will examine the problems of 
providing care for the terminally ill as seen from the
viewpoint of the ethics of justice as contrasted with the 
ethic of care.
In the midst of these discussions about what care 
should be available to whom and at what cost, the concept of 
palliative care has been gradually developing within the 
structure of the hospice movement. During the last twenty 
years, the hospice movement has been not only the voice but 
the heart of palliative care philosophy. Similar to Carol 
Gilligan's metaphor for women's way of reasoning, hospice 
has been a "different voice" in health care.10
Advocates of palliative care are hesitant about placing 
too much emphasis on the cost-saving benefits of hospice 
care. If the justification for palliative care is based 
solely on its ability to conserve health care dollars the 
fear is that the boundaries between palliative care and 
futile care will become blurred. While palliative care en­
hances comfort and improves the quality of the patient's 
life with no specific therapy being excluded from consider­
ation, futile care places limits on what treatments will be 
available based on that treatment's ability to cure, amelio­
rate, improve or restore a quality of life that would be 
satisfactory to the patient.11 Palliative care explores and 
evaluates options in the context of the patient's values; 
futile care frames the decisions within the physician's 
medical expertise consistent with the available medical 
literature. Emily Friedman, a health policy analyst, fears
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that futility policies will be applied unevenly and doubts 
whether implementation will be free of social bias, includ­
ing age, gender, and income.12
Palliative care is not about achieving "efficient or 
cost-effective dying."13 It is about the ethical responsi­
bility of our society to care for the dying when the inevi­
table limits have been reached. "What hospice care itself 
acknowledges is the fundamental relatedness and mutual obli­
gation of human social membership."14
In an effort to support my premise that society has an 
ethical responsibility to provide palliative care for the 
terminally ill, it became evident to me that the ethic of 
care, as developed initially by Carol Gilligan and later 
expanded upon by Nel Noddings, provided the substance for my 
argument. These two women were the initial pioneers. Howev­
er, there have been a small, but steady succession of psy­
chologists, philosophers, and ethicists who have continued 
to refine the concept. Some have begun speaking the lan­
guage of care when discussing care for the dying. The most
comprehensive approach to the ethic of care and public
policy was recently written by Joan C. Tronto. Where Gill­
igan and Noddings were very firm in their beliefs that the
ethic of care was primarily a feminist ethic and could stand
alone to support our moral behaviors, Tronto believes that 
it is not just a feminist ethic. It is a perfect complement
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to round out the shortcomings of a viewpoint based on a 
formal concept of justice.
Dr. David J. Roy, in his presentation, "Is Palliative 
Care a Matter of Justice?" defines a formal concept of 
justice as one in which all beings of a given category 
should be treated alike. The dilemma then becomes: (1) who
are the beings that belong in the same category and (2) what 
is the treatment that they should be given? Dr. Roy pro­
poses that "there is no current theory of justice that can 
answer these questions." 15 Furthermore, he proposes that 
what is needed is a radically different concept of justice.
I would suggest that rather than developing a new concept of 
justice, a complement of justice and care can be used to 
support palliative care.
There is support in the literature to substantiate pro­
viding palliative care as an ethically sound way to provide 
health care for one who is dying. By promoting the ethic of 
care along with the principles of justice, individuals and 
society in general can be shown the need and see the benefit 
of caring for the terminally ill.
I propose that the only way to ensure that palliative 
care is a readily available option for all terminally ill, 
regardless of whether they are enrolled in a health care 
plan or not, is to make the provision of palliative care a 
matter of public policy. "Only when the needs of the dying 
receive a reasonable priority in political, economic, and
medical discussions will the financing needed to deliver 
hospice services to all in need be assured."16 The fact of 
the matter is that in almost all instances the dying will 
receive medical care whether it be provided in their home or 
in a facility, and those who have no health care coverage 
are generally treated in an acute care facility which is the 
most cost intensive point of service. The only question 
that remains is whether the care that the dying receive will 
be provided by a caring community sensitive to their needs 
with an emphasis on symptom control, or will it be an "allo­
cation of medical care according to an individual's per­
ceived utility or relative worth to society?"17
It is imperative that the progress that has already 
been made by those in the hospice movement over the last 
twenty years be the foundation for the development of this 
policy. A precedent has already been set by the establish­
ment of the Hospice Medicare Benefit in 1983. Palliative 
care is a benefit available to all who are insured under 
Medicare. It is now time to extend that same benefit to all 
terminally ill persons.
Chapter 2 will provide a history of the hospice move­
ment with a thorough discussion of palliative care. Based 
on the three desired outcomes of a successful health care 
policy (increased access, decreased costs, and increased 
quality), several recommendations will be made for develop­
ing public policy that includes the provision of palliative 
care for the terminally ill.
After a brief discussion of autonomy and justice, chap 
ter 3 will take an in-depth look at the ethic of care as 
developed by Noddings and Gilligan. Finally, the possibili 
ty of combining justice and care in order to support the 
provision of palliative care as public policy will be ex­
plored.
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CHAPTER 2 
PALLIATIVE CARE AS PUBLIC POLICY
Although palliative care is truly an "old art of medi­
cine"1, it is one that is now taking on significant impor­
tance as the hospice "movement" comes of age. Hospice is 
gaining recognition and acceptance as a provider of special­
ized care for the terminally ill. With a focus on improving 
the quality of care extended to terminally ill patients 
while controlling the cost, hospice has achieved two of the 
three desired outcomes of health care policy. The third 
component is increasing access. In most instances these 
goals have proven to be conflicting. However, there is 
evidence suggesting that a change in public policy pro­
moting palliative care as the treatment of choice for the 
terminally ill would enable hospice to achieve all three 
goals of a successful health care policy.
As a background to the discussion of the ethics of 
justice vs. care in the hospice movement, this chapter shall 
examine the "coming of age" of the discipline of palliative 
care and the evolution of the hospice program of care, the 
development of its philosophies and standards, conflicts 
that surround the delivery of palliative care and the criti­
cisms that have been leveled against it. Additionally,
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policy issues will be explored and recommendations will be 
proposed. For the purpose of this discussion, hospice care 
and palliative care will be used interchangeably as the hos­
pice philosophy espouses the provision of palliative care 
services and this interchange of terms is an accepted prac­
tice in the literature.
The Coming of Age of Palliative Care
The concept of palliative care has most recently 
evolved in three countries: Great Britain, Canada, and the
United States. Great Britain was the trailblazer by 
incorporating hospice benefits into their national health 
plan and developing the first specialty training programs in 
palliative medicine for physicians.
Approximately 25 years ago, Dame Cicely Saunders opened 
St. Christopher's Hospice outside of London. It was born 
from a mission of providing palliative care services to the 
terminally ill in a homelike setting, a vision that combined 
scientific medicine and nursing with a belief that terminal 
care was part of a continuum of treatment, not a sudden 
"soft option" (e.g. an excuse for failure on the part of the 
medical profession.)2
Dr. Saunders began her hospice work as a volunteer 
nurse at St. Luke's Hospital (formerly known as St. Luke's 
Home for the Dying Poor). In order to look at the pain (not 
just the physical pain, but the emotional and spiritual 
pain) of terminal illness, she completed medical school and
12
began as the first full-time doctor at St. Joseph's Hospice. 
Dr. Saunders, together with the Sisters of St. Joseph, began 
to develop what she called an appropriate way of caring for 
the dying. Saunders emphasized the need for effective 
control of symptoms (particularly pain), care of the patient 
and family as a unit, an interdisciplinary approach to care, 
the use of volunteers, a continuum of care across all treat­
ment settings (home, inpatient, other residential), and 
follow-up of the family members after the death of the 
patient.
The Canadian model of hospice differs from the British, 
functioning more like the American model, because it "takes 
hospice to the patient rather than the patient to the hos­
pice"3. Although there are several prominent Canadian 
physicians who are strong advocates of palliative care, the 
number of palliative care programs has leveled off and may 
even be decreasing.4 However, Canada has the distinction of 
developing the first hospital-based hospice in North Ameri­
ca, the palliative care unit at the Royal Victoria Hospital 
in Montreal.
The fact that hospice care in the U.S. is primarily 
home-based, while in England the focus is more facility- 
based with some adjunctive home care services, is the prima­
ry difference between the two countries. There are far more 
similarities than differences. The hospice movement began 
in this country as a grass roots effort run primarily by
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volunteers. The best known established effort to adapt the 
British model of hospice to American health care is the 
Branford Hospice at New Haven, Connecticut which opened in 
the late 1970's. In 1983, after conducting demonstration 
projects throughout the U. S., Medicare began offering a 
hospice benefit to Medicare Part A beneficiaries. Hospice 
has experienced tremendous growth since that time, from 516 
hospices in 1983 to over 2000 today, and several authors are 
now reporting that hospice has become an accepted part of 
the health care system.5
Hospice Philosophy and Standards of Care
The guiding principles of hospice care, initially 
emphasized by Dr. Saunders, became the foundation of 
Medicare's Hospice Benefit and the Standards of Care as 
outlined by the National Hospice Organization. A signifi­
cant issue that the hospice movement has struggled with is 
the establishment of a universally accepted definition of 
what constitutes palliative care. If ever the concept is to 
be an accepted component of a public policy on health care, 
it is imperative that there be acceptance of a single defi­
nition. A definition of palliative care was drafted by the 
Standards Committee of the National Hospice Organization 
(NHO), the first national trade organization representing 
the hospice industry, in order to have a "gold standard" by 
which hospice programs could measure their decisions about
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what was appropriate hospice care. Palliative care, as de­
fined by NHO is:
treatment that enhances comfort, and improves the 
quality of the patient's life. No specific therapy 
is excluded from consideration. The test of palli­
ative treatment lies in the agreement by the patient, 
the physician, the primary caregiver, and the hospice 
team that the expected outcome is relief from dis­
tressing symptoms, easing of pain, and enhancement of 
quality of life. The decision to intervene with an 
active palliative treatment is based on the treat­
ment's ability to meet the stated goals rather 
than its effect on the underlying disease. Each 
patient's needs must continue to be assessed and all 
treatment options explored and evaluated in the con­
text of the patient's values and symptoms.6
In short, hospice care is about choice, with the empha­
sis on controlling symptoms and improving the overall quali­
ty of life, rather than on the reversal of the basic disease 
process.
The hospice emphasis on palliative care, rather than 
prolonging life, means that many disorders are not treated 
as in other care settings. "Anemia, infections, and an­
orexia, for example, are not treated with transfusions, 
antibiotic therapy, or mechanical feeding and hydration."7 
The focus is on easing the discomfort caused by symptoms of 
the disease process.
Hospice has the distinguishing characteristic of an 
interdisciplinary team approach to care. "The team attempts 
to draw together and coordinate the planning and work of all 
persons who have contact with the terminally ill in each 
specific case."0 Indeed, this concept is so germane to hos­
pice, it is one of the Conditions of Participation required
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for a hospice to be certified for reimbursement by Medicare. 
The basic hospice team consists of the patient's attending 
physician and hospice medical director, nurses, medical 
social workers, chaplains, other therapy providers (physi­
cal, occupational and nutritional), counsellors, and volun­
teers. In addition, the patient and other family members 
are also considered team members. This multidisciplinary 
approach is one of the cornerstones of hospice care.
Hospice administrative boards are meant to be multi­
disciplinary as well and strive to move in two parallel 
directions.
On the one hand to preserve the autonomy, integrity, 
and flexibility of the hospice team within the health­
care establishment; and, on the other hand, to make 
sure that there is adequate representation from hospi­
tal administration, influential physicians and nurses, 
and to ensure that the program will have the support of 
the medical community.9
If the objectives of hospice are to be achieved, it is 
imperative that teamwork exists at both levels: administra­
tive and direct patient care.
Factors Influencing the Development of Hospice
It has been said that hospice has grown from the dis­
satisfaction of some health care providers with the manage­
ment of terminal illnesses in the traditional, acute care 
medical model. It is curious to note that those involved in 
hospice care are predominantly female. The question arises, 
was the emergence of hospice influenced by the fact that the 
medical establishment was male-dominated? Advances in medi­
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cal technology were now allowing physicians to prolong life 
beyond what was ever believed possible, and patients were 
not being given a choice to forego life-saving or life-pro­
longing therapies in lieu of having symptoms controlled ade­
quately and preparing for their eventual deaths. One of the 
primary contributors to patient satisfaction with hospice 
care is the direct involvement of the patient in the deci­
sion-making (self-determination). In light of the histori­
cally paternalistic approach of the medical profession, this 
may be one of the reasons patients are not routinely in­
formed by their physicians that hospice care is an alterna­
tive.
Even more significant is that "modern medicine brought 
with it a stance toward death that is ambivalent about its 
necessity and inevitability."10 In the frenzy to save a 
life at any cost, "[T]he whole apparatus of modern hospital 
care seems designed to create a nonperson of the 'terminal' 
patient and to sequester him as a slightly indecent failure 
of modern technology."11 Since hospice was in direct con­
flict with what was common medical practice, it is under­
standable that it was not readily accepted as mainstream 
medical care. At least one author believes that hospice is 
still not at that level of acceptance. "The movement is at 
a crossroads; the future challenge is to become ingrained in 
mainstream medicine where terminal care is an automatic part
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of a physician's training, and all hospitals and long-term 
institutes offer hospice programs."12
Not to be overlooked is the prevailing attitude of 
the general public regarding illness and death. Generally 
speaking, death is not a socially acceptable topic of con­
versation. No longer is death seen as the necessary and 
inevitable end point of life. Philip Aries, French histori­
an, has contrasted the concept of a "tame" death that was 
"tolerable and familiar, affirmative of the bonds of commu­
nity and social solidarity, expected with certainty and 
accepted without crippling fear" with the "wild" death of 
technological medicine which began to occur in the late 19th 
century "marked by undue fear and uncertainty, by the pres­
ence of medical powers not quite within our mastery, by a 
course of decline that may leave us isolated and degrad­
ed. "13 Advances in medical technology have mislead us into 
thinking we have a ultimate control over our own mortality.
Criticisms of Hospice
There is a minimal amount of information in the litera­
ture that offers criticism of hospice or palliative care. 
What was found can be summarized into three categories: 
elitism, disrespect for life, and futile care.
A brief, summary of opposing viewpoints was found in an 
article, "Criticisms of Hospice" by Holly Fleischman in 
which she cites two primary criticisms of hospice care.
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First, hospice caters to an elite class, "particularly 
cancer patients from the white, middle, and upper classes, 
who have supportive families."14 While it is true that in 
its formative years hospices served cancer patients almost 
exclusively, this was not a result of elitist activity. It 
was more a result of limits of the medical profession and 
their ability to predict disease outcome with some degree of 
certainty. Because of the somewhat predictable life expec­
tancy of cancer patients, oncologists were the primary 
supporters of the hospice movement. Hence, the primary 
diagnosis cared for in a hospice program was cancer. It is 
only within the last five to seven years that medicine has 
been able to give a more accurate prognosis for other ill­
nesses and have recognized the value of hospice care for 
these patients as well. Currently, in most hospice pro­
grams, approximately 75% of the patients have cancer as 
their diagnosis. The other 25% is comprised of patients 
with cardiac, respiratory and immunological diseases (this 
includes AIDS).
The second criticism is that rather than affirming 
life, hospice may actually hasten death by not utilizing 
life-support equipment. Furthermore, the hospice program 
may be "so emotionally or financially attractive that pa­
tients are induced to forego aggressive and curative treat­
ment options."15
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In answer to these criticisms it is important to rein­
force hospice's goal to affirm life, "providing the dying 
every opportunity to live as full a life as possible and to 
enjoy as much freedom and control as they are able."16 By 
not utilizing life-support equipment, hospice is not injur­
ing the patient nor hastening death, but allowing death to 
occur naturally as a cause of the particular terminal ill­
ness .
With its holistic approach to caring for the patient 
and family, hospice is meant to be "emotionally attractive" 
to patients. Currently, this is the only type of care that 
provides this much needed support for the dying. In 
addressing the criticism of financial attractiveness, I 
would say that the burden should not be placed on hospice to 
change. Caution should be exercised in the development of 
health care policy so that hospice is not promoted as a 
justification for care-as-conservation of resources. This, 
in fact, would have the potential of inducing patients to 
forego other treatment options.
The second reference offering criticism of hospice care 
is found in The Hospice Movement by Cathy Siebold. Again, 
hospice was criticized for inhibiting a patient's fight for 
life. The fear is that "if the natural death philosophy 
(meaning that death is a natural human experience) comes to 
dominate medical practice, for example, the individual who 
wants to use every conceivable medical technology to prolong
20
his or her life regardless of cost or efficacy becomes the 
odd person out." 16
This is a legitimate fear and has recently become a 
topic for discussion in questions surrounding futile care 
policies. Futile care is defined as "any clinical circum­
stance in which physicians and their consultants, consistent 
with the available medical literature, conclude that further 
treatment (except comfort care--palliative care) cannot, 
within a reasonable possibility, cure, ameliorate, improve 
or restore a quality of life that would be satisfactory to 
the patient." 17 The advancement of hospice philosophy is 
not what is driving the establishment of futile care poli­
cies. Futile care policies are driven by a need to control 
costs and the hope that if there are defined rules that 
everyone has theoretically agreed to, patients' rights will 
be protected.
Another criticism of hospice care that is not readily 
found in the literature is the fact that some programs limit 
access to care by requiring patients to have a caregiver in 
order to receive hospice services. Since hospice is 
primarily a home care program, it is understandable that a 
caregiver in the home is desirable. It is extremely 
difficult to provide services to a terminally ill patient 
in a home when there is no one physically present to assist 
the patient. However, it is also not legitimate to deny 
services to those without caregivers. This is truly a
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dilemma for hospice providers and for all who are concerned 
about providing quality care for the terminally ill.
Public Policy Issues
The public debate about palliative care focuses on the 
issues of choice, cost, outcome and the balance between 
quality and cost. It is incumbent upon the hospice industry 
to provide the information needed by consumers and policy­
makers to make decisions that will serve the needs of soci­
ety.
Choice
Although the issue of choice was addressed in a previ­
ous section in more detail, it is important to reiterate 
that patients have the right to be able to make informed 
choices about the type of treatment they desire. The key 
concept is "informed". In order for one to make a decision 
about treatment options one must have information that is 
clear and understandable. One needs to know about the 
consequences of each decision. For example, if one chooses 
to have radiation and chemotherapy as treatment for a par­
ticular type of cancer, it is imperative to have knowledge 
of not only the side effects but of the success rates with 
such treatment. One also needs to know that 'no treatment' 
is an option. The patient shouold know that this option 
exists at every step of the decision-making process, and
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that if no treatment is the option, palliative care is 
available.
It has been said that one of the reasons patients 
choose treatment, even when there is a minimal success rate, 
is fear of being abandoned by the health care system. The 
symbolic message conveyed by offering curative treatment 
only is that patients can only feel truly cared for when the 
most modern invasive technologies are applied. If pallia­
tive care is readily available and offered as an option, 
that fear can be eased.
Cost of Care
Given the ever-increasing cost of health care in this 
country, it is necessary to evaluate the current financial 
impact of palliative care and what the ramifications would 
be of increasing availability. Aiken and Marx, in their 
writing about hospice and public policy, discuss the unan­
ticipated consequences of modifying payment for health 
services and the policy debate regarding the provision of 
hospice services. The authors believe that the debate cen­
ters around devising methods of payment that will make 
needed services accessible without costly duplication of 
services or exploitation of the dying by proprietary inter­
ests .10
Although studies of hospice care have demonstrated the 
cost savings that can be achieved by substituting palliative 
care in the home or a hospice facility for aggressive, cure-
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oriented hospital care, some analysts remain worried about 
encouraging the growth of a new health care institution that 
may add to the public's expense at a time when we are faced 
with reducing present commitments for basic health services 
for the poor and the elderly.19
The majority of data gathered about the cost-effective­
ness of hospice care revolves around the provision of care 
as outlined by the Hospice Medicare Benefit (HMB). The Hos­
pice Medicare Benefit was the precursor of managed care and 
has become a model for providing a comprehensive program of 
care for the terminally ill in a cost-effective manner.
Since the first funded demonstration project in the early 
1980's, it was recognized that the provision of hospice care 
as outlined by Medicare was a cost-effective way to care for 
those dying of a terminal illness. "A major rationale for 
hospice reimbursement by Medicare and other insurance pro­
grams is the premise that hospice care, by substituting home 
care services for hospital inpatient care, is less expensive 
than conventional care."20 Several studies have shown that 
more than 2 0% of Medicare expenditures are for terminally 
ill patients who are not part of a hospice program, with the 
majority of these expenses occurring in the final month of 
life.
By contrast, it has been demonstrated that hospice care 
provides the greatest savings in the final 1-2 months of 
life. One of the largest studies ever conducted was the
Medicare Hospice Benefit Program Evaluation. It found that 
when a patient was on a hospice program from 30-59 days, a 
freestanding hospice saves $1.59 for every $1.00 spent by 
Medicare for Part A services.21 A study conducted in 1991 
by Nathan Adelson Hospice, Las Vegas, Nevada showed a mini­
mum of 40% cost savings over traditional methods of caring 
for the terminally ill patient.22
The "Benefit" became available in 1983 as part of the 
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) of 1982.
One of the ways in which the HMB achieves cost savings is in 
its per diem method of reimbursement. The agency caring for 
the terminally ill patient receives a preset amount of reim­
bursement on a daily basis. The rate of reimbursement 
differs only according to treatment setting (i.e. home or 
inpatient). The only cost for the patient is a 5% copayment 
for drugs. In return, the hospice provides for all the 
needs of this patient that pertain to the terminal illness. 
For example, the hospice provides all nursing services, 
counselling, medications, supplies and medical equipment. 
This system of reimbursement allows the hospice team, which 
includes the patient and family, to control how and where 
care is delivered and makes the hospice accountable for 
monitoring the cost of care.
Although the Hospice Medicare Benefit has been proven 
to be cost effective, other third party payors have been 
less enthusiastic about providing comprehensive hospice
services as a covered benefit. Due to the proliferation of 
mandated benefits, many are required to offer a hospice 
benefit, but very few offer one that is comparable to that 
of Medicare. The benefit offered in the private sector 
usually limits the type and frequency of services as 
directed by a representative of the insurance company.
Often services are unbundled and parcelled out in a "Fee for 
Service" manner similar to the way traditional home health 
care is provided. This drastically reduces the efficiency 
gained by the package of multidisciplinary services as out­
lined by the Hospice Conditions of Participation required 
for Medicare certification. When this occurs the cost 
saving benefits that could be achieved are lost.
Another difference in the provision of hospice benefits 
by third party payors is the imposition of an unrealistic 
"cap" or maximum limit on the amount of benefits available. 
This can be as low as $2000. With the average cost of hos­
pice home care being about $75 per day and hospice inpatient 
care about $350 per day, a $2000 benefit would provide for 
approximately 25 days of care at home, or 6 days in a hospice 
facility. Remembering the statistic that the greatest 
expenditure for Medicare patients occurs in the final month 
of life and that savings from hospice care are highest 
during the last 1 - 2  months of life points out the dispari­
ty in providing a benefit that limits services at the exact 
time when they can be most cost effective. A limitation of
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this kind encourages patients to utilize less efficient, 
more costly forms of care (i.e. hospital emergency rooms, 
home health agencies and acute inpatient care).
Although the reasons for resistance to providing rea­
sonable reimbursement for hospice services among most pri­
vate insurance companies is not quite clear, there are 
several possibilities. (1)There seems to be a lack of 
awareness about the advantages of palliative care on the 
part of the day-to-day decision makers. (2)The demand for 
services by beneficiaries of private insurance companies is 
low. Private insurers generally provide coverage for a 
young, healthy, working population and typically this group 
does not give a lot of thought to the possible need for 
hospice care.
Outcome
Hospice is about making possible what Weisman calls 
"appropriate death." An "appropriate" death is "one that is 
as pain free as possible, permitting an individual a measure 
of control and decision-making power that is both possible 
and desirable, given the patient's health, value system, and 
needs."23 Weisman outlines four conditions that must exist 
in order for death to be appropriate: awareness, accep­
tance, propriety and timeliness. Awareness is about more 
than just knowing one has a terminal illness. It is about 
"open awareness" which implies an atmosphere that encourages
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communication and the sharing of ideas, feelings, and expec­
tations.
Acceptance of one's death is about an open confronta­
tion with whatever problems may arise during the dying 
process. Propriety implies dying in a way that does not 
conflict with others' expectations (i.e. having tended to 
one's affairs, being as independent as one's situation 
allows, and being able to withdraw from others when one 
chooses.) Timeliness reflects the individuals sense of the 
"right" or proper time to die. This usually is contingent 
upon completing any "unfinished business."
The hospice benefit encourages involvement as early as 
six months before death in order to allow the team to assist 
the patient and family in achieving an "appropriate death" 
by working through the many anticipatory grief issues that 
occur. Currently the national average length of stay on a 
hospice program is only 59 days. This is far less that what 
many consider to be adequate to allow for achieving an 
"appropriate death."
Quality vs Economy
"The primary debate about hospice focuses on whether 
terminally ill people and their families can be better cared 
for, in terms of comfort and quality of life, if care is 
provided in their homes or in special institutions as op­
posed to conventional inpatient institutional medical 
care."24 Perceptions of well-being and feelings of discom­
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fort are the two major components of quality of life accord­
ing to a comparative study done by Yates, McKegney and Kun 
at the Vermont Regional Cancer Center. Perceptions of well­
being relate to independence in self-care, desire for food, 
and overall assessment of condition. Discomfort is evaluat­
ed by pain, inability to sleep, and other uncomfortable 
symptoms.
The National Hospice Study followed 1754 terminal 
cancer patients in 40 hospice programs and 14 conventional 
care settings during the period 1981-83 and found that 
quality of life was similar for patients in hospice and 
conventional care.25 However, a secondary analysis of the 
data found that the quality of death (the last three days of 
life) was significantly better for those in hospice.26 The 
criteria identified by patients as being important was 
freedom from pain and being able to stay at home. In 
addition, most hospice programs survey surviving family 
members to determine levels of family satisfaction with 
hospice care. Anecdotal evidence suggests an overall 
satisfaction rate of approximately 95%. In the past, this 
data has not been compiled on a nationwide level. However, 
in 1994, NHO implemented a universal survey tool to measure 
satisfaction and will publish the results.
Studies done by W. L. Freeman as an audit of hospital 
care for terminal cancer patients reveal a strikingly 
different outcome. "Less-than-optimal" treatment was given
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for pain to 92 percent of the patients, 91 percent for 
nausea and vomiting, 100 percent for breathing difficulties 
and 93 percent for pulmonary secretions.27 In another 
assessment of pain control, Foley states that "physical pain 
occurs in from 60 to 90% of advanced cancer patients but is 
inadequately controlled in about 25%.1,28
According to Aiken and Marx, in order to justify chang­
ing reimbursement patterns two questions must be answered:
1. Is the impact of hospice care on the quality of 
life of the terminally ill and their families as good 
or better than conventional arrangements (i.e. acute 
hospital care)? and,
2. If the quality of life is the same or better, 
would there be a major change in the cost to insurers?
The results of studies quoted in previous sections make it 
clear that hospice has made a tremendous impact on the 
quality of life of the terminally ill and their families.
One could make the assumption, given Freeman's horrifying 
statistics, that any level of hospice care would result in 
better care than what is currently available. However, 
hospice care delivered in its entirety, with all the compo­
nent services, provides the best possible solution.
The response to Aiken and Marx's second question is the 
subject of ongoing debate. The argument has been made that 
just by making a benefit easily accessible and promoting its 
value, the number of people utilizing the benefit will
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increase, hence the cost of providing the care will 
automatically increase. However, in the case of providing a 
specialized type of care to those dying of a terminal ill­
ness, the argument is not valid for two reasons.
First, the number of people who are dying will not 
increase solely on the basis of availability of a benefit. 
Although it is true that as the population increases there 
is a natural rise in the number of deaths, that is a differ­
ent argument.
Second, for the most part, the terminally ill are 
receiving care in some form. More than likely this care is 
being provided in a more costly, less palatable manner (i.e. 
frequent visits to emergency rooms, reoccurring hospitaliza­
tions that probably include the requisite x-rays and lab 
tests). Another concern is that some of the care is being 
provided by non-profit health care organizations. This in 
turn places a financial burden on the community supporting 
the non-profit. It is legitimate to suggest that if one 
allocated all the money being spent to care for the termi­
nally ill in non-palliative driven settings to providing 
palliative care, there would not be an increase in cost. 
Perhaps there would even be a reduction. I would agree with 
Aiken and Marx's premise that if quality of life is the 
same, there would be no reason to change reimbursement 
patterns. However, if it is improved, as it is with hospice 
care, do we not have a moral obligation to attempt to mobi-
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lize financial resources in order to provide a higher quali­
ty of care?
Policy Recommendations
The discussion in this chapter has focused on the bene­
fits of providing palliative care as the treatment of choice 
for the terminally ill. The primary issues have been how to 
increase access to care and maintain a high level of quality 
without escalating the overall costs.
Reviewing the philosophies and standards of the hospice 
industry emphasizes the commitment of the National Hospice 
Organization to providing its members the leadership and 
direction needed to offer a consistent level of high quality 
services. The conflicts surrounding the implementation of 
hospice services have been discussed and the criticisms of 
palliative care have been enumerated.
Based on the three desired outcomes of a successful 
health care policy (increased access, decreased costs, 
increased quality), I am making the following recommenda­
tions :
Increased Access
In order to increase access to palliative care, hospice 
services must be available for all who are dying of a term­
inal illness. This requires a change at several levels. 
First, at the federal level, the Hospice Medicare Benefit 
should be preserved and used as a model for other hospice 
benefit programs. Second, at the state level, public
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assistance programs (i.e. Medicaid, Medical, etc.) or state 
health care plans, should include hospice care as one of the 
available benefits. Third, all other third party payers 
should offer a hospice benefit that is comparable to that of 
Medicare. Fourth, at the community level, a community 
based, not-for-profit hospice should be developed and sup­
ported through donations in order to provide hospice care 
for those who are not included in the other categories.
Education is the second component of increasing access. 
Making a hospice benefit available is insufficient; consum­
ers of health care and providers (primarily physicians and 
nurses) must be educated about the availability and benefits 
of hospice care. It is incumbent upon hospice programs to 
work within their local communities to facilitate 
discussions about death and dying as well as treatment 
choices for the terminally ill. No one is better equipped 
to do this than hospice providers.
Developing curricula for health care providers that 
emphasize patient autonomy and teach concepts of death and 
dying, and offer specialty training in palliative medicine 
is the second tier of the educational component. One author 
suggests a curriculum for physicians in terminal care that 
would include instruction in pain and symptom management, 
provision of care in various settings (i.e. home, hospital, 
hospice, nursing home), communication skills, psychosocial 
issues, team interaction, and bioethical issues.29 At the
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very least, these classes should be available as electives. 
Teaching physicians how to save lives as well as how to 
recognize when a life cannot be saved will require a great 
deal of revamping of current medical school curricula. Even 
more problematic may be providing a framework in which 
physicians can learn to acknowledge that they must work as 
partners with other members of the health care team and that 
the patient is also a partner with a voice that must be 
acknowledged.
Decreased Costs
Hospice has remained a cost-effective way of caring for 
the dying. With the goal of hospice being to keep people in 
the familiarity and comfort of their own or a family 
member's home, the number of days spent in acute care set­
tings by the terminally ill has decreased with the use of 
hospice services. Persons not enrolled in hospice spent 23 
of their last days in the hospital, while patients enrolled 
in hospice spend only eight days in acute care settings.30 
Since acute care (i.e. hospitals) is the most expensive 
treatment setting (approximately $1,756 per day), admitting 
patients to hospice programs (approximately $90 per day for 
home care and $350 for inpatient care), can decrease the 
costs for this specific population.31
The Hospice Medicare Benefit, with its per diem method 
of reimbursement, has demonstrated that the cost of care can 
be decreased by providing a holistic approach to the deliv-
34
ery of services. I would recommend that the per diem 
reimbursement be maintained and that services model the 
Hospice Medicare Benefit in order to maintain maximum 
efficiency and benefit.
Increased Quality
in order for us, as a nation, to discuss a change in 
policy, it is imperative that everyone be speaking the same 
language using universally accepted definitions and terms. 
The National Hospice Organization's definitions of pallia­
tive care and hospice philosophy should be adopted as the 
language to be used when speaking of palliative care. NHO's 
membership has spent several years crafting these tools for 
exactly this purpose.
Medicare's guidelines for hospice have been in effect 
since 1986 and have undergone only one revision. For nearly 
ten years they have been providing hospices with standards 
by which to judge the quality of their programs. They are 
well-accepted in the hospice community and have proven to be 
beneficial in maintaining quality care. Adopting the Medi­
care Conditions of Participation in conjunction with the 
NHO's Standards of Care as benchmarks will provide a uniform 
method for measuring and maintaining the quality of care 
being provided to the terminally ill.
It will be important to implement safeguards to protect 
the rights of the terminally ill to ensure that palliative 
care is not used as a justification for care-as-conservation
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of resources. Since euthanasia and futile care policies are 
being debated more often than ever before, the motivations 
for providing palliative care--making possible a "good 
death"-- must be constantly reiterated, supported and safe­
guarded to ensure that palliative care is not used as a 
justification for care-as-conservation of resources. I 
would urge us to supplement the limited terms of the eutha­
nasia and futile care debates with a discussion of an ethic 
of care as a way to promote humane, compassionate care for 
the dying.
I propose that if palliative care, as it is currently 
defined by the experts (hospice providers), is made avail­
able to all terminally ill persons, it will be the treatment 
of choice for most and will not place an undue burden on our 
health care system.
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CHAPTER 3 
AUTONOMY, JUSTICE AND CARE
An ethic of care has a long-standing and prominent 
place in the history of medicine, summarized nicely by the 
15th century French adage, "to cure sometimes, to relieve 
often, to comfort always." Nursing literature has articu­
lated an ethic of care as a commitment to protecting and 
enhancing the patient's dignity, going beyond good inten­
tions or simple kindness and including psychologic, philo­
sophic or religious, and physical components, taking into 
consideration the patient's social context and specific 
goals (Fry 1988; Gadow 1985; Watson 1985).1
After a brief discussion of patient autonomy, this 
chapter will offer an in-depth look at the ethic of care, 
examining its modern-day origin, progression toward accep­
tance, and some of the criticisms of it. In order to accom­
plish this, the works of Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings 
will be explored in depth with Joan C. Tronto's writings 
concerning moral boundaries offering additional support.
The question of whether an ethic of care can singularly 
support the provision of palliative care as public policy 
or whether it requires a combination of justice and care 
will also be explored.
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Autonomy
Personal autonomy has been defined as "the right [of a 
person] to bodily integrity, to control his or her own body, 
and to define his or her own existence."2 In the case of 
the terminally ill, this entitlement protects a person's 
right to refuse unwanted medical treatment. "Patients have 
a right to know their condition, to choose or reject the 
treatment regimen, to choose or reject attempts to prolong 
their life, and to decide the disposal of their remains."3 
With the acceptance of palliative care within the structure 
of organized medicine, control can be given back to the 
terminally ill. With the advent of the Patient Self-Deter­
mination Act (PSDA) of 1990, people have an opportunity to 
make such decisions prior to entering the health care sys­
tem.
As explained later in this chapter, a central 
characteristic of caring is the sharing of mutual respect 
for the autonomy of both members of the caring relationship. 
In the case of palliative care that would be patients and 
the health care professionals. An additional advantage of 
this caring relationship with the terminally ill is that 
"the process of dying can be a period of moral development 
for both the patient and the professional. By appropriately 
caring for patients, members of the team simultaneously can 
develop their moral awareness, their character and profess­
ional maturity. 1,4
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An Ethic of Care
Ethics is defined as the philosophical study of morali­
ty (actual beliefs and practices that we turn to when we 
must decide what we ought to do). The principles of ethics 
guide us through moral quandaries utilizing moral reason­
ing.5 Karl Wellman has defined moral reasoning as "a pro­
cess by which one attempts to identify, organize, analyze 
and justify human acts in order to determine what is the 
right thing to do in a given situation."6 Many ethical 
discussions originate from the Greek framework of ethical 
theory with a dominant "... focus on virtue and right reason 
as central concepts for the moral evaluation of agents and 
actions."7
It is Noddings' assessment that ethics has been 
discussed largely in the language of the father: in
principles and propositions, in terms such as justification, 
fairness, justice. In proposing her ethic of care, Noddings 
argues that human caring and the memory of caring and being 
cared for form the foundation of ethical response. And, 
typically, it is in the language of the mother that these 
responses are vocalized.®
Some (Noddings 1984; Gilligan 1982; Baier 1987; Blum 
1987; Ruddick 1989; Walker 1989) who advocate the recogni­
tion of an ethic of care claim that there is a distinct 
difference in the way moral reasoning generally occurs in 
males and females, and that the ethic of care is reflective
of what has traditionally been categorized as a "feminine" 
method of reasoning.9 In this context, "feminine" reflects 
the search for women's unique voice that advocates 
nurturance, care, compassion and networks of commu­
nication.10 It is important to note that this discussion is 
not meant to imply that there is no place for men in this 
ethical concept. There is, however, the implication that 
what Kohlberg saw as the traditional method of masculine 
moral reasoning, based on an ethic of justice, stressing 
rules and rights, is in direct contrast to the ethic of 
care.
The beginnings of those ideas of a 'female ethic', 
'feminine1 nature, and specifically female forms of virtue 
which have formed the essential background to a great deal 
of feminist thinking about ethics can be traced back to the 
eighteenth century.11 It was during this time that 
industrializing cities saw the emergence of questions about 
femininity and female consciousness arising from the changes 
in women's social situations. "A subordinate but virtuous 
and idealized wife and mother, whose specifically female 
virtues both defined and underpinned the private sphere of 
domestic life, came to dominate a great deal of eighteenth 
and nineteenth century thought."12 Since these first 
inferences to an ethic of care there has been a progression 
not only in how to think about it, but also as to what 
place, if any, it has in the hierarchy of moral theories.
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In a short time, philosophical writers have taken the ethic 
of care from a feminine theory to a feminist theory to a 
holistic ethic13 to "an adequate theory of how we might make 
human societies more moral."14
For Noddings, when individuals (male or female) adopt 
an ethic of care, they base their judgements and actions on 
their relationships with and responsibilities to other 
individuals. If one subscribes to the idea that a point of 
morality is to establish a world in which we remain in 
relation to one another, caring is taken to be the very 
foundation of the ethical. This concept "of care as an 
ethical orientation and its contrast to the patriarchal 
preference for individual rights and justice has powerful 
impact on many fields...and has garnered an enthusiastic 
international following."15
Gilliqan vs. Kohlberq
The first discussions of an ethic of care were the 
result of Carol Gilligan's work wherein she described what 
she calls the "different voice" of women. She challenged 
Lawrence Kohlberg's work on moral reasoning and launched an 
important debate about the gender boundary implicit in 
Kohlberg' s theory.16
His goal was to explain the development of moral rea­
soning by posing hypothetical moral dilemmas to his sub­
jects, initially young boys at a preparatory school and 
later, young girls at a private academy. "His work has been
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viewed as the definitive account of moral development and it 
has had a large influence on psychologists, educators, and 
political philosophers such as Jurgen Habermas and John 
Rawls." (Kohlberg's theory of moral development is alluded 
to in Rawls's A Theory of Justice.)17
An individual1s response to various moral scenarios 
expresses, according to Kohlberg, the level of moral devel­
opment of that person. The classic example of a moral 
dilemma, cited in most discussions of Kohlberg, is known as 
the Heinz dilemma. Heinz lives in a faraway country with 
his wife who is sick. The pharmacist in his town has a drug 
that can make his wife well; without the drug she will die. 
Heinz cannot afford the drug, and the pharmacist refuses to 
give it to him unless he can pay for it. The dilemma: 
should Heinz steal the drug?18
Kohlberg devised this dilemma as one in a series in 
order to measure moral development in adolescents by 
presenting a conflict between moral norms and exploring the 
logic in their ability to resolve such dilemmas. "Kohlberg 
believes that there are definitive stages of moral develop­
ment and, moreover, that there is a measure of congruence 
between it [moral development] and psychological development 
with regard to cognitive skills."19
Kohlberg established six stages, two stages in each 
level, to categorize moral development. The stages in the 
pre-conventional level are, (1) "heteronomous morality," the
amoral stage of avoiding punishment, and (2)"individualis­
tic, instrumental morality," where one acts and expects a 
similar response. Stages three and four, (3)"interpersonal- 
ly normative morality," the "good boy" stage, and (4)"social 
system morality," expands the audience to whom one's moral 
judgements are oriented. The range extends from people who 
are the closest to you to abiding by the rules and judge­
ments of others as extended to the entire community.20
The third level, labeled post-conventional and princi­
pled, includes stage five, the stage of prior rights and 
social contract, and stage six, "morality of universal- 
izable, reversible, and prescriptive general ethical princi­
ples."21 At stage five, one is concerned that "laws and 
duties to society be based upon the ideal of the greatest 
good for the greatest number." As a rational creature, "one 
is obligated to abide by the precepts, which embrace life 
and liberty, to which one had otherwise agreed." This is 
seen as a utilitarian moral theory. If one has developed to 
the ultimate level of stage six, it is accepted that "there 
are universal ethical principles that all should follow, and 
which take priority over all legal and other institutional 
obligations."22 The person is no longer ruled by self- 
interest, the opinion of others, or the force of legal 
convention, but by self -legislated and self-imposed univer­
sal principles such as those of justice, reciprocity and 
respect for the dignity of human beings as intrinsically
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valuable persons. Stage six is based on a deontological 
theory of morality. According to Kohlberg, very few people 
reach the post-conventional stages; the estimate is approxi­
mately five per cent.
Although Kohlberg's study involved many pre-adolescent 
students, the results of his interviews with two eleven year 
olds (one boy and one girl) are most frequently used as 
typical examples of how this theory is applied. Given the 
Heinz dilemma, the young boy decides that the husband should 
steal the medication, seeing it as a conflict between the 
values of property and life. This, decision is considered to 
be conventional (a mixture of stages three and four) for the 
boy's age and cognitive development. Kohlberg feels that 
"his ability to bring deductive logic to bear on the solu­
tion of moral dilemmas, to differentiate morality from 
law,and to see how laws can be considered to have mistakes, 
points toward the principled conception of justice that 
Kohlberg equates with moral maturity."23
The young girl's response is quite different. She does 
not believe that the drug should be stolen; neither does she 
think the wife should be allowed to die. She contends that 
there should be discussion between the husband and 
pharmacist and thinks that another solution could be worked 
out. Perhaps the husband could pay for the drug over a 
period of time. Her solution lies in a further examination 
of the relationships involved: wife to husband, husband to
wife, pharmacist to community. In light of Kohlberg's 
stages, the girl is scored at a full level lower than the 
boy is. "Scored as a mixture of stages two and three, her 
responses seem to reveal a feeling of powerlessness in the 
world, an inability to think systematically about the con­
cepts of morality or law, a reluctance to challenge authori­
ty or to examine the logic of received moral truths."24 
Kohlberg found her reliance on relationships and her belief 
in communication as the mode through which to resolve moral 
dilemmas a sign of dependence, vulnerability and naivety.
She is thought to be in the pre-conventional stage.
It is from this point that Gilligan begins to develop 
her theory of a "different voice." Gilligan sees the girl's 
response as a demonstration of "awareness of the connection 
between people that gives rise to a recognition of responsi­
bility for one another, a perception of the need for re­
sponse;" a sense of community.25 Seen in this light, the 
girl's understanding of morality as arising from the recog­
nition of relationship, her belief in communication as the 
mode of conflict resolution, and her conviction that the 
solution to the dilemma will follow from its compelling 
representation seem far from naive or cognitively 
immature."26 Rather, these insights seem to reflect the way 
women, either instinctively or by virtue of conditioning, 
make moral decisions and are central to an ethic of care.
Gilligan believes that the difference in logic used by 
the young girl and the boy stems from the way they interpret 
the question. The young boy considers whether or not the 
person should act in the proposed dilemma while the young 
girl interprets "how" one should act. Furthermore,
Gilligan's work attempts to substantiate her claim that when 
one studies the moral development of women, a process emerg­
es that is quite different from Kohlberg's six stages. 
Namely, "the moral problem arises from conflicting responsi­
bilities rather than from competing rights and requires for 
its resolution a mode of thinking that is contextual and 
narrative rather than formal and abstract."27 This concept 
of morality, as concerned with the activity of care, centers 
moral development around the understanding of responsibility 
and relationships, just as the concept of morality as fairn­
ess ties moral development to the understanding of rights 
and rules. "Traditionally, many psychologists and philoso­
phers have reasoned from an androcentric point of view, 
seeing women's moral inferiority where they should have seen 
women's moral difference."28
Gilligan's account of women's moral development has 
three stages that are traversed, with the third assuming 
moral maturity. At level one, the self is the sole object 
of a woman's concern. In level two, she moves to an overem­
phasis on others. Finally, level three is a proper emphasis 
on self in relation to others. "A woman attains moral
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maturity when she stops opposing her needs in favor of 
others, simultaneously recognizing the falseness of this 
polarity and the truth of her and others['] interconnected­
ness . 1,29
A work by Joan C. Tronto, Moral Boundaries, critically 
examines the works of both Kohlberg and Gilligan. Her 
criticism of Kohlberg is that his theory of moral develop­
ment is hierarchical in its stages based on the fact that 
"an individual's progress through successive stages of moral 
development requires that his or her sense of moral 
reciprocity deepens. Reciprocity deepens through the abili­
ty of an individual to assume different roles. Thus, moral 
development, though a cognitive process, is dependent upon 
certain kinds of social stimulation in order to occur."30
Although Tronto does not support Kohlberg's assump­
tions, she also takes exception to Gilligan's premise of a 
different voice being feminine, an alternative way to 
conceive of morality. She sees it as an account of partial 
privilege that only reinforces the existing moral boundaries 
and deemphasizes the need for change in our concept of 
gender roles. "Women presumed to speak in a different moral 
voice are both partially privileged yet ultimately excluded 
from the loftiest type of moral thinking."31 Designating a 
different voice as a woman's morality only supports the 
notion that men and women have different moral capacities. 
Because of the assumption that those who are in power are at
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a higher level of moral development and, therefore, morally- 
privileged, women advocating speaking in a "different" 
moral voice inadvertently place themselves in the disadvan­
taged category since they are generally not the ones in the 
privileged positions. Putting oneself in this position pro­
vides no incentive for promoting an ethic of care.
Tronto believes that there is equal necessity for both 
care and justice orientations for a full and proper morali­
ty; "women need not be the bearers of a women's morality; 
but in order for all people, men and women alike, to be 
fully human, it is necessary that all possess both the 
orientations of justice and Gilligan's ethic of care."32
Nel Noddinqs1 Approach to Caring
Just two years after the publication of Gilligan's 
work, Nel Noddings, an Associate Professor of Education at 
Stanford University, published her book, Caring. A Feminist 
Approach to Ethics and Moral Education. Her intent was to 
produce an essay in practical ethics from the feminine view, 
rooted as it is in relation and identifying joy as a basic 
human affect. "Joy" is described as a feeling, rather than 
an emotion, and is considered a reflective mode of con­
sciousness. It is the recognition of and longing for relat­
edness that form the foundation of this ethic, and the joy 
that accompanies fulfillment of our caring enhances our 
commitment to the ethical ideal that sustains us as the 
'one-caring'. In the caring relationship, both parties con-
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tribute: the 'one-caring' and the 'cared-for'. In order
for the relation to be described as caring, one's caring 
must be completed in the other. The natural caring which is 
described as "the human condition that we, consciously or 
unconsciously, perceive as good" provides the motivation of 
ethical caring. The perceived "good" is the condition 
toward which we strive, "and it is our longing for caring-- 
to be in the special relation-- that provides the motivation 
for us to be moral." Noddings says "relation will be taken 
as ontologically basic and the caring relation as basically 
ethical." She recognizes human encounter and affective 
response as basic facts of human existence. We want to be 
moral in order to remain in the caring relation and to 
enhance the ideal of ourselves as 'one-caring.'33
Although Noddings presents caring from what she refers 
to as the "feminine" view ("feminine in the deep classical 
sense--rooted in receptivity, relatedness and responsive­
ness, in the way that some believe women reason morally")34, 
this is not to say that all women will accept it or that men 
will reject it. What she is saying is that men and women 
can and must learn how to care if they are to become moral 
beings. This concept is supported by Rosemarie Tong when 
she says "an ethic of care can be communicated just as 
effectively as an ethic of rules and principles."35
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The 'One-caring'
Caring involves, for the 1 one-caring', a "feeling with" 
the other. This is seen as having two distinctive features: 
engrossment and motivational displacement. Engrossment is 
characterized as a receptive mode of consciousness charac­
terized by absorption and sensory concentration in which "we 
receive what is there as nearly as possible without [self] 
elevation or assessment."36 Engrossment is not restricted 
to only the emotional. "There is a characteristic and 
appropriate mode in caring." This appropriate mode of 
consciousness is a switch "from an assimilatory mode to a 
receptive-intuitive mode which allows us to receive the 
object, to put ourselves quietly in its presence." This is 
clearly different from the "analytic-objective mode in which 
we impose structure on the world." Motivational displace­
ment means that we apprehend the other's reality so that, 
"when we see the other's reality as a possibility for me, we 
must act to eliminate the intolerable, to reduce the pain, 
to feel the need to actualize the dream."37
Functioning as the 'one-caring' requires more than 
feeling. A motivational shift is needed. One does not 
relinquish herself, but allows her energy to be at the 
service of the one for whom she is caring. It is a shift to 
the receptive or relational mode. Noddings believes the 
receptive mode is at the heart of human existence, with 
existence defined in the existential sense of living with
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heightened awareness to include awareness of and commitment 
to what we are doing and what we are living. As the 'one- 
caring, ' one receives the other into herself and sees and 
feels with the other, becoming a duality. However, "I am 
not caused to see or feel--that is, to exhibit certain 
behavioral signs interpreted as seeing and feeling--for I am 
committed to the receptivity that permits me to see and to 
feel in this way." 38 The 'one-caring' sees the best self in 
the 'cared-for1 and works with her to actualize that self.
Undoubtedly, at times, the 'one-caring' will shift out 
of this mode in a response to converting what we have re­
ceived from the other into a problem, something to be 
solved. At this point, we move away from the cared-for in 
an attempt to objectively analyze, study and interpret the 
data of the cared-for's reality. These "turning points", as 
Noddings refers to them, are entirely appropriate as long as 
we recognize the shift. She describes it as keeping our 
objective thinking tied to a relational stake at the heart 
of caring, when we fail to do this, we lose ourselves as 
one-caring focusing on the problem rather than the person.
Concentric Circles of Caring
According to Noddings, those who are 'one-caring' find 
themselves at the center of a concentric circle of caring.
It begins with caring for oneself and expands to those we 
may never actually know. For those who are in the inner 
circle, we care because we love them. They are usually
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family or close friends. As we move outward, there are 
those for whom we have personal regard, such as neighbors 
and colleagues. The "guidelines" for these relationships 
are a reflection of "someone's sense of relatedness institu­
tionalized in our culture."39
Beyond this group are those one has not yet encoun­
tered. They may be linked to the inner circle by such means 
as spouses of children. One must be prepared to care for 
these people. "Chains of caring are established, some 
linking unknown individuals to those already anchored in the 
inner circles and some forming whole new circles of poten­
tial caring. I am prepared to care through recognition of 
these chains."40
Noddings discusses the dilemma of the stranger who is 
not bonded through the chains of caring. How are we sup­
posed to respond? Her answer is to remain receptive. "In 
an important sense, the stranger has an enormous claim on 
me, because I do not know where he fits, what requests he 
has a formal right to make, or what personal needs he will 
pass on to me." Aware of one's limitations, there may be a 
fear of a request that cannot be met without hardship.
Is it appropriate to establish caring chains with 
trust, rather than love, as the affective link? Noddings 
believes it is. For example, one may not be able to person­
ally be present for the health care needs of those in the 
community, but one can respond to an appeal for public sup­
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port for an allocation of dollars for improvements in the 
provision of health care by someone in whom one trusts. In 
Tronto's discussion of caring, she makes a distinction 
between "caring about" and "taking care of". This will be 
given more attention later on.
The 'Cared-for1
What is the responsibility, if any, of the 'cared-for1 
in the relationship? Noddings would say the 'cared-for' 
responds to the presence of the 'one-caring' with caring 
being completed in all relationships through the apprehen­
sion of caring by the 'cared-for.' "The attitude that is 
perceived by the 'cared-for' as caring is generated by ef­
forts of the 'one-caring' at inclusion and confirmation."41 
When this attitude is missed, the one who is the recipient 
of care-taking feels like an object.
The concept of reciprocity surfaces again in the dis­
cussion of the 'cared-for.' As previously mentioned, in 
order for caring to be actualized, there must be recognition 
on the part of the 'cared for.' This does not mean that the 
'cared-for' must also care for the 'one-caring.' Although 
it is true that mutual caring can occur, that is not what is 
meant by reciprocity.
Referring to the concept of engrossment, a receptive 
mode of consciousness helps describe reciprocity. It occurs 
when the 'cared-for' acknowledges and responds to the par­
ticular form of engrossment in the 'one-caring.' In order
to "behave ethically in the potential caring relation, the 
'cared-for' must turn freely toward his own projects, pursue 
them vigorously, and share his accounts of them spontaneous­
ly."42 Additionally, by sharing aspirations, appraisals and 
accomplishments, the 'one-caring' has a fuller knowledge of 
what the 'cared-for' is striving toward and more readily 
supports these efforts. "The motivational displacement of 
caring occurs naturally, supported by any responsiveness of 
the 'cared-for.' The 'one-caring' for a fully participating 
'cared-for' is sustained and invigorated and her caring is 
unlikely to deteriorate to cares and burdens."
The freedom, creativity and spontaneous disclosure of 
the 'cared-for' that manifests itself under the nurturing of 
the 'one-caring' completes the relationship.43 Even when 
one cares, if the 'cared-for' does not feel it or believe 
it, Noddings claims that the relationship cannot be charac­
terized as caring. This points out a limit of caring.
The Ethical Self
Noddings believes that the ethical self is an active 
relation between one's actual self and a vision of one's 
ideal self as 'one-caring' and 'cared-for.' One's ideal 
self, as 'one-caring,' comes about as a result of the good­
ness that is felt when one accepts and affirms the internal 
"I must". The "I must" is described as the natural impera­
tive that arises "directly and prior to consideration of
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what it is that I might do" as I receive the other. "This 
vision of what I might be is the genuine product of car­
ing."44 In other words, it is the moral imperative. This 
goodness, according to Noddings, is an assessment of the 
state of natural caring, some degree of which each of us has 
been dependent upon for our continued existence.
My caring for others and their caring for me enables me 
to care for myself. This allows me to "receive the vision 
of what I might be, enabling the 'I must1 to arise with 
respect to the ethical self." My acceptance and affirmation 
of this caring for self will commit me to strive toward the 
other in spite of feelings of doubt, aversion or apathy. 
Summoning a concern for the ethical self is what prompts the 
"I must" in situations where it would not arise naturally.
If I did not care for my physical well-being, I would not be 
able to appreciate the efforts of those who care for me. 
Noddings suggests that the answer to the question, "why 
should I behave morally?" is because I am or want to be a 
moral person. She believes that the interest in moral 
behavior arises out of our natural impulse to care.
Moral Boundaries
A more recent look at the ethic of care by Joan Tronto 
takes the concept one step further. Tronto sees the ethic 
of care as more than a discussion of "women's morality".
This way of thinking leads some to believe that it is not 
part of the realm of moral choice, but merely a discussion
of values that are traditionally associated with women. 
These values are described as attentiveness, responsibility
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nurturance, compassion, and meeting others' needs. It is 
Tronto's position that these values are traditionally ex­
cluded from public consideration and "tied to the 'natural­
ness' of women's caring, that is either instinctive, or 
deeply social or cultural behavior."45 In order to include 
an ethic of care in our definition of a good society, it 
will be imperative to move these values from our private 
lives into a political context. It is upon this premise 
that I suggest that the ethic of care can provide the sup­
port needed to establish a policy of access to and endorse­
ment for palliative care.
It is Tronto's belief that care is a universal aspect 
of human life; "it is not universal with regard to any 
specific needs, but all humans have needs that others must 
help them meet. Several scholars have argued that what we 
care about defines who we are as people and as unique indi­
viduals."46 Tronto sees the ongoing process of caring 
divided into four phases: 'caring about','taking care of',
'care-giving', and 'care-receiving'. Within these four 
phases are four ethical elements: attentiveness, respon­
sibility, competence, and responsiveness.
'Caring about' is noting that a need exists and making 
an assessment that this need should be met. It is highly 
individual and usually culturally shaped. For example,
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hospice relies heavily on the use of volunteers. They are 
considered a core service and are a requirement for Medicare 
certification. Upon hearing a public service announcement 
requesting volunteers, one person may acknowledge that this 
is a legitimate need. Another may comment about what a 
waste it would be to spend time with someone who is dying, 
preferring instead to spend time with a youth organization 
because he could see the results of his efforts.
In order to be able to care about the needs of others, 
one must be attentive, accepting the fact that others mat­
ter. Tronto believes that our society has an unparalleled 
ability to "know" about others due to the proliferation and 
availability of information; and yet, the temptation is in­
creasingly to shut others out and focus only on our own 
needs.
1 Taking care of' is the next step and involves assuming 
responsibility and determining how to respond. One does not 
necessarily need to assume personal responsibility. It is 
more recognizing that some action can be taken. 'Taking 
care' of generally involves an agency that bears the respon­
sibility. Tronto views responsibility as both central and 
problematic requiring constant reevaluation. Responsibility 
is not to be confused with obligation. Obligations general­
ly arise from promises we have made or formal/legal bonds; 
responsibility comes from implicit cultural practices. 
"Ultimately, responsibility to care might rest on a number
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of factors; something we did or did not do has contributed 
to the needs for care, and so we must care."47 Responsibil­
ity can also have different meanings depending on one's 
gender roles. For example, traditionally women have had the 
responsibility for care-giving.
When extending this idea of responsibility vs. obliga­
tion to a physician's role in the care of the terminally 
ill, it may illuminate a physician's dilemma in choosing be­
tween advocating continuation of curative forms of treatment 
or palliative care. Perhaps the ability to recommend pal­
liative care hinges on whether the physician sees her role 
as one of responsibility rather than one of obligation. 
Undoubtedly, the physician feels a sense of responsibility 
for the patient's well-being. However, if the physician has 
a sense of obligation, feeling that there is an imminent 
commitment to do everything in her power to prevent the 
death of a patient, she may find it unethical to suggest 
palliative care. This could be construed as a breach of 
faith between the physician and patient.
In her argument for the inclusion of care as a politi­
cal and philosophical notion, Tronto is suggesting "that we 
are better served by focusing on a flexible notion of re­
sponsibility than we are by continuing to use obligation as 
the basis for understanding what people should do for each 
other."40 This suggests that performing out of obligation 
provides one with less opportunities for flexibility in
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decision making. However, caring encompasses responsibili­
ties that go beyond obligation. This flexible notion would 
give a physician a kind of "permission" to offer palliative 
care and recognize that this demonstrates responsible behav­
ior that is concerned with a patient's well-being.
'Care-giving' is about the personal responsibility to 
directly meet the needs for care. It involves physical 
work, and for this reason, providing money for care is not 
considered to be care-giving; rather, it is taking care.
This distinction is crucial to her argument. It has been 
our history to relegate those with care-giver status to a 
position of lesser value and, at the same time, to perceive 
the allocation of money, either private donations or public 
funds as a form of care-giving. Tronto believes that the 
fact "that we quickly equate in the United States the provi­
sion of money with the satisfaction of needs points to the 
undervaluing of care-giving in our society."49 This differs 
from Noddings' 'one-caring' in that Noddings' classification 
encompasses both 'taking care of' and 'care-giving.' The 
contribution of money or other resources to providing care 
does not, in Noddings' opinion, diminish the value of the 
effort.
Tronto argues that a paradigm shift is necessary. We 
must move from accepting care as necessary, but delegating 
it to others of a particular gender or social class, to a 
premise that holds care as a process by which life is sus-
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tained and therefore placed at the center of our moral and 
political universe. In other words, instead of placing the 
responsibility for caring on others who are generally 
considered to be of a lower social status, each of us must 
accept responsibility for being 'care-givers.'
Competence in care-giving is seen as a moral notion.
If one intends to provide care, accepts the responsibility 
for it, but does not provide good care, Tronto would say the 
need for care is not met. The only exception would be if 
the resources were not available to the caregiver. For 
example, a spouse who is himself debilitated may not be able 
to provide competent care for his ill partner. This 
situation begs the question, should the community (in this 
context, community means through the provision of public 
funds) take responsibility for care-giving and could this be 
accomplished within the current budget constraints. In the 
recent attempts to provide universal access to health care, 
one of the primary deterrents was the ability to finance 
this care.
The issue of how competency is determined can be very 
controversial. Who will set the standards? Should it be 
done through peer review, government oversight, community 
oversight, or a combination of all of these? Currently, 
entities such as state medical and nursing boards set the 
standards for practitioners and federal agencies such as
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Health Care Finance Administration set certification guide­
lines based on standards of care.
In Tronto's final phase of caring, 'care-receiving', it 
is recognized that the object of care will respond to the 
care it receives. Tronto is concerned that if the evaluat­
ion of the care received is not examined from the perspec­
tive of the recipient, how care-givers choose to meet the 
perceived needs may cause new problems. Responsiveness, 
considering the other's position as that person expresses 
it, is the moral element that prevents this potential prob­
lem. This issue is of particular concern when dealing with 
providing pain medication for palliation. Far too often a 
physician or nurse will take the position that a patient 
does not really need his pain medication based on the care­
givers perception of pain and/or beliefs about addiction. 
Hospice has taken on the additional responsibility of edu­
cating professionals and lay people about the need to treat 
a patient's pain or other uncomfortable symptoms as the 
patient desires. This may even mean providing no relief if 
that is the patient's preference.
By its very nature, care deals with conditions of 
vulnerability and inequality. This is the position in which 
the 'care-receiver' finds herself. Tronto contends, "[T]he 
moral precept of responsiveness requires that we remain 
alert to the possibilities for abuse that arise with vulner­
ability. " 50 Being at the end of one's life as a result of a
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terminal illness epitomizes vulnerability. The potential 
for abuse is readily apparent. This is frequently an issue 
in the decision making process of the terminally ill when 
faced with the choice of continuing therapy or electing pal - 
liative care. It has been reported that patients are con­
cerned about disappointing their physicians who have been 
working very hard to control the progression of the disease. 
Patients have said that there is a sense, on their part, 
that if they do not continue to engage in curative treat­
ment, they are not putting forth all of their effort. By 
selecting palliative care they perceive themselves as "giv­
ing up" and fear their physicians will do the same.
There are many other examples of the vulnerability 
felt by one who is dying, such as the conflict of wanting to 
maintain control over the daily events of one's life and 
accepting the fact that the eventuality of death cannot be 
controlled.
Moral Pilemmas in Caring
Tronto recognizes that there are moral dilemmas that 
are specific to the universality of an ethic of care. She 
outlines these as difficulty in assessing needs, parochial­
ism, sublimated needs of care-givers, detached care, other­
ness, paternalism and privileged irresponsibility.
Since the needs for care are infinite and the resourc­
es, both personal and public, are finite, there will always 
be moral dilemmas. Tronto argues that the problem of deter­
mining which needs should be met requires a theory of jus­
tice to determine the degree of urgency of the needs. 
However, Rawls' theory of distributive justice, according to 
Tronto, requires that one view the assessment of needs from 
the perspective of 1 caring about' and 'taking care of'. In 
other words, not as one who will provide care but from the 
detached perspective of recognizing that a need exists and 
determining how the need should be responded to. The harm in 
this perspective is that the 1care-givers' and perhaps even 
more importantly, the ’care-receivers', are excluded from 
the process of prioritizing the needs. To illustrate this 
point, let us remember how decisions about health care are 
made in the context of a health maintenance organization 
(HMO). A "gatekeeper" system is used. Patients who are 
insured by an HMO are first seen by the lowest level of 
professional in the physician hierarchy, the physician's 
assistant (P.A.). The P.A. determines whether or not the 
patient requires the skill of a physician. If so, this 
physician will be a general practitioner who will then 
decide whether or not to refer to a specialist. The system 
encourages care to be provided at the least costly level 
possible. The HMO created this system from the detached 
perspective of recognizing that a need existed and deter­
mined how it should be responded to. Neither physicians 
(care-givers) nor patients (care-receivers) participated.
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In a revision of this system, physicians may be asked to 
contribute but patients probably will not. 'Care-receivers' 
as participants in decision making are generally devalued 
because they are considered to be the needy. They need the 
help of all of the others. Tronto recommends, "[A]ny con­
cept of needs must account for the concrete nature of needs 
and how they are met through care, and must also contain 
some way to make judgments about the worthiness of competing 
needs".
The issues of parochialism and sublimated needs of 
caregivers are at opposite ends of the moral dilemma spec­
trum. On one hand, the concern for parochialism arises from 
the fact that care requires more than an abstract involve­
ment. It is not enough to 'care about' and 'take care of'. 
However, the requirement to be a 'care-giver' and 'care-re- 
ceiver' can lead one to be so narrowly focused that one 
loses the ability to address more global concerns. For 
example, if I am caring for someone who is dying, I will be 
so consumed in my caring that I will have no concern for 
those who may be dying without someone to care for them. 
Tronto suggests that it is reasonable to expect some form of 
partiality, particularly during times of intense care-giv­
ing.
On the other hand, when providing care, there is often 
a struggle between the needs of the care-giver and the needs 
to be met. A considerable level of anger can accumulate on
both sides. The care-giver often must sublimate her needs 
for the one for whom she is caring. This can result not 
only in subverting the process of care, but ultimately could 
result in denying or withholding care. From the 'care- 
receiver's' perspective, there is often a resentment at 
having to depend upon another for care. Tronto believes 
that since the ethic of care acknowledges this dilemma as a 
potentially serious moral problem, it is more likely to be 
able to solve these types of problems than other ethical 
perspectives.
This dilemma is seen very frequently in the hospice 
setting. Generally, patients become part of a hospice 
program of care after a lengthy illness. There may have 
been a reversal of roles (i.e. the wife, who has been the 
care-giver in the family, is now the care-receiver.)
The roles of the care-giver and care-receiver have been 
firmly established and both parties have been feeling the 
emotions previously described. Because hospice philosophy 
encompasses treating the patient (care-receiver) and family 
(care-givers) as a unit, it is well equipped to deal with 
these very real issues. Providing patients and family 
members with support and counseling to assist them in re­
solving such issues is a part of the delivery of hospice 
services. There are minimal resources within the tradition­
al medical model for these types of services due to costs. 
However, in hospice, within the daily rate of reimbursement,
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these services are not only readily available, but are 
encouraged and provided at no extra cost.
Another dilemma with care is the perception of "others" 
who are recipients of detached care. Taking a global per­
spective, it is not possible to provide care to all for whom 
one might feel some responsibility. Therefore, individuals 
often take care of much more than they give of direct care. 
As those who are being taken care of become more distant, it 
is easier to relegate them to the status of being "those 
other people" for whom we are not required to be responsi­
ble. Presumably, the theory of reciprocity should assist us 
by allowing us to put oneself into the "other's" situation. 
However, Tronto asserts that since we are not able to com­
prehend all the dimensions of the other's position, the more 
likely result is that there will be an incomplete under­
standing rather than a morally sensitive response. An 
example of this would be someone who is heterosexual attemp­
ting to put oneself in the position of a homosexual dying 
from AIDS. That person may be sympathetic to the situation, 
but probably cannot put himself into the other's situation. 
Tronto turns to Aristotle for support in this area. Ari­
stotle's philosophy about an ultimate good for the sake of 
which all other goods are pursued, suggests this standard: 
"since the task of care is to maintain, continue, and repair 
the world so that we can live in it as well as possible, we 
should do what will best achieve this end."51 If we can
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relegate caring to the position of being an ultimate good, 
we can then acknowledge the fact that all people will be 
either in the position of being a 'care-giver' or 'care- 
receiver'. By recognizing this inevitability, we can than 
move to accept that by virtue of our position (care-giver or 
care-receiver) a kind of inequality will emerge. Tronto 
suggests "that a moral theory that can recognize and identi­
fy these issues is preferable to a moral theory that, be­
cause it presumes all people are equal, is unable even to 
recognize them. "S2
The issue of paternalism is very closely related to the 
inequality issue. "Caring does not occur between two equal 
and autonomous actors. There is a dependency relationship 
of one upon another."53 The risk is that the perception of 
the needs of the 1 care-receivers' will become more defin­
itive than the actual needs. Caring must "go beyond good 
intentions or simple kindness and...take into consideration 
the patient's social context and specific goals."54 There 
is a danger that those who receive care will lose their 
autonomy and their sense of independence.
Privileged responsibility takes the problem of pater­
nalism one step further. if one accepts that the caring 
needs of some groups are met more completely than others and 
is concerned that this pattern follows the distribution of 
power in society, one can see the danger in privileged 
responsibility. There seems to be nothing to inhibit the
relatively powerful (most likely the 'care-givers'), from 
defining their needs as more important than those of the 
care-receivers. And, by looking only at whether or not their 
needs are being met as a measure of their caring responsi­
bilities, they will have no reason to examine the situation 
from any other perspective. Tronto points out that in the 
context of the American ideology of individualism, universal 
morality is not an automatic solution to this problem.
The founders of hospice recognized this risk and 
developed a philosophy to safeguard against it. The hospice 
guidelines issued by Medicare and the National Hospice 
Organization explicitly include the patient and the family 
as members of the Interdisciplinary Group in order to pre­
vent them from being excluded in the decision-making pro­
cess. However, there is often a difference between the 
ideal situation and reality. The fact that physicians, 
nurses and other of the "helping" professions are also part 
of the Interdisciplinary Group makes the potential for 
detached care, otherness and paternalism very real. The 
fact that these issues are identified in an ethic of care as 
moral questions that must be acknowledged and dealt with 
allows one to feel hopeful. If one supports care as the 
foundation of the provision of palliative care, it provides 
reassurance that a system of checks and balances will be in 
place to safeguard against abuse.
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Every moral theory has its problematic areas. Often 
the debate about an ethic of care is whether or not it is 
compatible with other theories of moral reasoning. Tronto 
suggests that if one only looks at the different metaethical 
perspectives of, for example, care and justice, "any at­
tempts to make the two compatible are viewed as philosophi­
cally unsophisticated."55 However, if we combine the 
principle that care is necessary with the particular prac­
tices of providing care in a given situation, compatibility 
can be achieved.
JUSTICE
"The distributive logic of the practice of medicine 
seems to be this: that care should be proportionate to
illness and not to wealth."56 However, in reality, care is 
not always proportionate to illness, and very often it is 
dependent upon the physician's perspective and the patient's 
insurance benefits or lack thereof.
If one accepts the theory of justice as "belonging to 
the domain of obligation rather than to the domain of chari­
ty and as being concerned with giving people what they 
deserve or should rightfully possess,"57 one can begin to 
understand the inability of justice to support the provision 
of palliative care. When decisions are made from a position 
of justice as fairness, we can suppose that the decision­
makers come from "a position wherein they are cooperating on 
terms to which they would agree if they were free and equal
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persons whose relations with respect to one another were 
fair. They could all view their arrangements as meeting the 
stipulations which they would acknowledge in an initial 
situation that embodies widely accepted and reasonable 
constraints on the choice of principles."58 Theoretically, 
this provides the basis for public acceptance.
Rawls determined that justice as fairness consists of 
two parts: (l) an interpretation of the initial situation
and of the problem of choice that it poses, and (2) a set of
principles which would be agreed to. This has come to be
known as the contract theory.59 A key principle so chosen 
would be: "All social primary goods--liberty and opportuni­
ty, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect--are to
be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any 
or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least 
favored.1,60 Rawls has built his theory of justice on the 
foundation of Kant's theory. Decisions are made from the 
"original position" behind a "veil of ignorance." Rawls 
believes "we can say that when persons act on these princi­
ples they are acting in accordance with principles that they 
would choose as rational and independent persons in an 
original position of equality."61
Gilligan's objection to this theory is that "morality 
is not grounded in universal, abstract principles but in the 
daily experiences and moral problems of real people in their 
everyday lives."62 In her disagreement Gilligan focused on
the question "how might what has to be done in this situa­
tion best preserve and nurture the human relationships 
involved?"63 Susan Okin offers support to Gilligan's per­
spective. Okin believes that Rawls' theory is flawed by 
believing that those in the original position should assume 
that people are mutually disinterested rather than mutually 
engaged.64 Many believe that we have lost our ability to 
make morally sound decisions about whose needs we will meet 
and that care must be practiced congruently with justice in 
order for our moral ideals to be put into action. This 
would still allow decisions to be made from an original 
position of equality, but it would include the reality of 
mutual engagement. Tronto believes that in order to ad­
dress the problems with care that she and others have iden­
tified a concept of justice is required along with a demo­
cratic and open opportunity for discussion, and more equal 
access to power.
Palliative care has not received full support from the 
standpoint of public policy because we have not yet dis­
cussed what dying people deserve. By reframing the issue, 
using an ethic of care to discuss how the terminally ill and 
their caregivers are mutually engaged with those who are 
healthy, palliative care becomes not only a viable option, 
but a desirable one. Because of our tendency to be a death- 
denying society, we have ignored the fact that people need a
special kind of care in their dying. That special kind of 
care exists in hospice.
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CHAPTER 4
PALLIATIVE CARE, JUSTICE, AND THE ETHIC OF CARE
CONCLUSIONS
Hospice is a philosophy of care designed to provide 
physical, emotional and spiritual support for people at the 
end of life. The goal is to allow the dying process to
unfold with a minimum of discomfort and the maintenance of
dignity and quality of life. Over 210,000 persons at the 
end of life and their families receive care annually by the
nearly 2,000 hospice programs in the United States.1
Since the median age of hospice patients is 65 years, 
the majority of hospice care is provided under the provi­
sions of the hospice Medicare Benefit. However, hospice 
care comprises a very small percentage of the total dollars 
spent on health care. For example, payments made for the 
hospice Medicare benefit were less than 1% of total benefit 
payments in 1994.2 Although this group is small by compari­
son to the entire population, their needs are great. Hos­
pice care is based on the premise that as a society, we have 
an ethical responsibility to care for the dying and this re­
sponsibility is grounded in the fundamental relatedness and 
mutual obligation of human social membership. It is impera-
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tive for the continued moral development of our society that 
we do not ignore the needs of the dying.
Providing health care benefits has traditionally been 
based on a Rawlsian principle of distributive justice, 
attempting to provide opportunities for equality of well­
being. A requirement of distributive justice is that people 
get what they deserve. The problem is determining what it 
is that they deserve. In a formal concept of justice, all 
beings of a given category should be treated alike. But, 
who are the beings that belong in the same category and what 
is the treatment that they should be given? I suggest that 
all who are dying of a terminal illness belong in the same 
category and the treatment they should be given is pallia­
tive care. It is a just society's responsibility to make 
this care available.
Robert Veatch discusses a "slice of time" perspective 
on justice. This means viewing the provision of just care 
for the terminally ill from the perspective of those who are 
currently in that position rather than from the vantage 
point of all of society projecting that someday they may 
have a terminal illness. "...an independent theory of 
justice will give planners at least prima facie reasons for 
committing substantial resources to the terminally ill."3
In a discussion of the future of palliative care, Abyad 
states his belief that conflicts between physicians, pa­
tients, families and institutions will continue to increase
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in the face of limited resources. He suggests several 
models upon which to rely:
(1) The autonomy model holds the patient's right to self- 
determination as supreme.
(2) The paternalism model allows the physician to guide 
and/or limit the available choices.
(3) The patient-provider collaboration aims for joint 
decision making.
(4) The beneficence model which requires the physician to 
act in the patient's best interest.4
Choices two and four point to the past. This is how 
our system has been operating and is in direct conflict with 
both an ethic of care and the philosophy of hospice care. 
Choices one and three are more compatible.
In her later writings, Nel Noddings has explained that 
her description of caring was meant to be "a phenomenologic­
al analysis of how we are when we care and are cared for."5 
She believes that we all must learn to care as a way of 
being in the world. The benefits of Noddings' perspective 
of care as a way of being in the world is the potentially 
profound impact this concept would make on relationships 
between those who are dying and those who are caring for 
them.
Health care professionals and an Ethic of Care
Edmund Pelligrino's four components of caring (care as 
compassion, doing for others, caring for medical problems,
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and taking care) provide the guidelines for the role of 
physicians in providing palliative care. "Instead of a 
relationship of curing between physician and patient, a 
relation of caring is needed to express the nature of the 
obligation between physician and patient."6 The fact that 
there is an obligation is supported by the principles of 
justice. The ultimate obligation is to achieve "patient 
good" and Pelligrino uses caring to accomplish this.
Nurses comprise the largest portion of health care 
providers in the United States and they have already articu­
lated caring as an important value.7 At least one author 
believes that the nursing actions of touching and truth- 
telling demonstrate a form of existential caring. "To touch 
the patient is to affirm the patient as a person rather than 
an object and to communicate the value of caring as the 
basis for nursing actions."9 Truth-telling assists the 
patient in assessing subjective and objective realities in 
illness and to make choices based on the unique meaning of 
the illness experience.
Justice and Care
According to Michael Walzer, most philosophers' deepest 
assumption is "that there is one, and only one, distributive 
system that philosophy can rightly encompass."9 However, 
both Gilligan and Tronto argue that there is equal necessity 
for both justice and care orientations for a full and proper 
morality. Several other authors (Card 1990, Okin 1989,
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Tronto 1993) have suggested that a combination of justice 
and care must take place in order to achieve an "adequate" 
ethic.
A major concern in combining justice with care in the 
support of palliative care is the tendency, when discussing 
justice, to posit one greatest good that is not the primary 
one for all people. Tronto believes that care will be the 
balancing force that will cause us to think about which 
needs are met and how, about the distribution of care, and 
about the its adequacy. We must be cautious not to mandate 
palliative care as the only alternative for everyone with a 
terminal illness. Instead, palliative care must be avail­
able as an option for all.
Palliative Care as Public Policy
The recommendations for how to change existing policies 
in order to create a climate for palliative care were out­
lined in Chapter 2. They were positioned within the 
framework of the three primary goals of health care reform 
(increased access, decreased costs, increased quality).
What was not addressed was Tronto's concept of care and 
political theory. She believes that only if we understand 
care as a political idea will we be able to change its 
status and the status of those who do caring work in our 
culture. Tronto advocates expanding our moral boundaries to 
include caring, in the ethical sense, into our political 
vision. She suggests that "the practice of care describes
the qualities necessary for democratic citizens to live 
together well in a pluralistic society, and that only in a 
just, pluralistic, democratic society can care flourish. 1,10 
An ethic of care relies on a political commitment to value 
caring and to reshape institutions to reflect this commit­
ment. I would suggest that this commitment would be valu­
able in reshaping public policy on palliative care.
Using an ethic of care to support providing palliative 
care affords our society a significant opportunity. That 
is, to profoundly impact the final relationship of one's 
life (as we know it), that between the dying and those who 
are caring for them. In light of the fact that we have 
become a society that shuns our dying, viewing them as 
failures of our health care system, this opens the door for 
a major shift in perspective.
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